Japanese Couldn’t Believe One P-61 Was Hunting Them — Until 4 Bombers Disappeared in 80 Minutes. hyn
They sent bombers every night.
conventional bombers, kamicazis, anything that could carry explosives.
The 418th Night Fighter Squadron had arrived at Muro on December 26th, 3 days earlier.
Smith squadron was the only thing standing between those bombers and 20,000 American troops sleeping in tents below.
The pressure was suffocating.
Every bomber that got through meant dead engineers, dead construction crews, delayed airfields, a delayed invasion, more American casualties at Lingayan Gulf.
Smith’s P61 was different from anything the Japanese had encountered.
The Northrup Black Widow was the first American aircraft designed specifically for night combat.
66 ft wingspan, twin Pratt and Whitney R2800 engines producing 2,000 horsepower each.
Top speed 30 66 mph.
But the real weapon wasn’t the four 20 mm cannons mounted in the belly.
It was the SCR720 radar mounted in the nose.
The radar could detect aircraft up to 5 m away in complete darkness.
The Japanese had no idea it existed.
Their bombers flew at night because they believed darkness made them invisible.
They were wrong.
The radar operator sat behind Smith in a separate compartment, watching a glowing screen that showed every aircraft within range.
Lieutenant Philip Porter was Smith’s radar operator.
He’d been tracking targets for 6 months.
He knew how to read the scope, how to vector Smith toward contacts, how to separate friendly aircraft from enemy bombers.
The problem was simple.
One P61, 12 Japanese bombers.
If Smith engaged one target, 11 others would slip through to bomb the airfields.
The mathematics were brutal.
Even if Smith shot down three or four bombers, the rest would complete their mission.
American casualties would mount.
The airfields would be damaged.
The invasion schedule would slip.
Smith had trained for this moment for 18 months.
Night fighter training at Orlando Army Airfield in Florida.
radar intercept procedures, night navigation, gunnery practice in total darkness.
The training was exhaustive because night fighting was the most dangerous form of aerial combat.
No visual references, no horizon, just instruments and radar returns and the hope that the target you were tracking wasn’t friendly.
The 418th had flown its first combat mission in November 1943, operating from primitive air strips in New Guinea, flying P70 Havocs at first, then modified P38 Lightnings with experimental radar.
The P61s arrived in September 1944.
The Black Widow was everything the earlier night fighters weren’t.
Stable, forgiving, powerful.
The radar actually worked.
But radar couldn’t solve Smith’s problem tonight.
12 bombers were coming.
His fuel would last maybe 3 hours.
If he spent 10 minutes engaging each target, he could only intercept three bombers before he had to return to base.
Nine bombers would get through.
Nine bombers meant hundreds of casualties.
Maybe thousands if they hit the fuel dumps or ammunition storage.
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Back to Smith.
Porter’s voice crackled through the intercom at 2342.
He had four separate contacts on the scope, all heading south toward Muro, all at different altitudes.
Smith had to make a choice.
Which bomber to pursue first, and whether his plan to intercept all four in one night was genius or suicide.
Smith pushed the throttles forward.
The twin R2800 engines responded instantly.
The Black Widow climbed at 2,000 ft per minute.
Porter called out vectors.
Heading 035, altitude 8,000 ft, range 4 miles.
Smith couldn’t see anything through the canopy, just blackness.
No moon, no stars, heavy clouds obscured everything.
This was why the Japanese chose tonight.
Complete darkness meant their bombers were invisible to conventional fighters.
But Smith wasn’t flying a conventional fighter.
The SCR720 radar used a rotating parabolic dish mounted in the nose.
The dish sent out microwave pulses at 180° forward.
When those pulses hit an aircraft, they bounced back.
The radar operator scope showed the return as a glowing blip.
The scope had two displays.
One showed azimuth left or right of the aircraft’s nose.
The other showed elevation above or below the aircraft.
Porter watched both scopes simultaneously.
He guided Smith toward the target using verbal corrections.
Left 5°, down 3°.
The system worked because Porter was exceptional at his job.
Range 3 m.
Smith activated his own radar scope.
A smaller display integrated into the main instrument panel.
When the target got close enough, Smith could track it himself.
The pilot scope was simpler than Porter’s.
just one display showing range and relative position, but it was enough.
Once Smith had the target on his scope, he could close for the kill without relying on verbal instructions.
The Japanese bomber was a Mitsubishi G4M.
The Americans called it Betty.
2,000 horsepower Mitsubishi Cas engines.
Maximum speed 270 mph.
Crew of 7.
Bomb load 1,760 lb.
The Betty had a critical weakness.
No self-sealing fuel tanks.
One burst from Smith’s cannons would turn the bomber into a fireball.
Range two miles.
Smith could see the target on his scope now.
The blip was steady.
The bomber crew had no idea Smith was behind them.
Japanese bombers had no tail warning radar.
No way to detect a pursuing night fighter.
They flew in darkness, believing they were safe.
The P61 made that assumption fatal.
Smith closed to 1,000 yd.
still couldn’t see the Betty visually.
The darkness was absolute.
He relied entirely on the radar scope.
The blip grew larger as the range decreased.
800 yd, 700, 600.
At 500 yd, Smith finally saw it.
A dark shape against slightly less dark clouds.
The bomber’s exhaust flames were barely visible.
Faint orange glows from the engine necessels.
Smith moved the P-61 into position slightly below the bomber, slightly behind.
The four 20mm Hispano M2 cannons were mounted in the lower fuselage.
Fixed forward, Smith had to aim the entire aircraft.
He used the N6 gun site integrated into his instrument panel.
The gun site projected an illuminated reticle onto a combining glass.
Smith adjusted his position until the bomber sat centered in the reticle.
Range 400 yd.
Smith armed the cannons.
Each cannon carried 200 rounds, 800 rounds total, enough for approximately 40 seconds of sustained fire.
But Smith wouldn’t need 40 seconds.
Night Fighter doctrine called for short, concentrated bursts.
Get close.
Fire.
Confirm the kill.
Move to the next target.
Wasting ammunition on a single bomber meant fewer rounds for the remaining targets.
Smith squeezed the trigger at 350 yard.
The four cannons fired in unison.
The sound was deafening even through the engine noise.
20 mm high explosive shells streamed toward the Betty at 2,800 ft per second.
The tracers looked like red lines drawn across the darkness.
Smith fired for 2 seconds.
12 rounds per cannon, 48 shells total.
The Betty’s right wing exploded.
Fuel ignited instantly.
The bomber rolled right and entered a steep dive.
Smith watched it fall.
The burning aircraft illuminated the clouds below.
It hit the water 8 mi north of Muro at 2357.
One bomber down, 11 remaining.
But Smith’s fuel gauge showed he’d burned through 15% of his fuel.
And three more contacts were still on Porter’s scope, all heading toward the airfields, all separated by miles of black sky.
And Smith had exactly 112 minutes of fuel remaining.
Porter identified the second target at 0014 on December 30th.
Heading 180, altitude 6,000 ft, range 6 mi.
Smith turned the P61 south and descended.
The problem was geometry.
The second bomber was 23 mi from the first kill.
Smith’s P61 cruised at 280 mph.
That meant roughly 5 minutes to intercept.
5 minutes the bomber spent flying closer to Muro, closer to the airfields, closer to completing its mission.
Smith pushed the Black Widow faster, 320 mph.
The R2800 engines consumed fuel at an alarming rate at high power settings.
Every minute at maximum speed cost him 3 minutes of patrol time, but if he didn’t intercept the bomber quickly, it would reach the target zone.
American anti-aircraft gunners would open fire.
The bomber might get shot down or it might release its bombs.
Either way, Smith would have failed.
The mathematics of night interception were brutal.
Most night fighter missions ended without contact.
The sky was enormous.
Even with radar, finding a single bomber required perfect coordination between pilot and radar operator.
Finding four bombers in one night was nearly impossible.
The 418th Night Fighter Squadron had scored 18 kills total since arriving in the Pacific theater.
18 kills in 14 months.
Smith already had four kills to his name.
Adding four more in one night would make him the top American night fighter ace of the war.
But records didn’t matter.
What mattered was stopping those bombers.
Porter called out corrections.
Smith adjusted heading.
The second contact grew stronger on the radar scope.
Range four miles, three miles, two miles.
Smith spotted the bomber at one mile.
Another Betty.
Same profile, same vulnerable fuel tanks.
The bomber was lower than the first one, 6,000 ft instead of 8,000.
Closer to the cloud layer.
That gave Smith less room to maneuver.
Smith positioned the P61 below and behind the target.
The approach had to be perfect.
Too fast and he’d overshoot.
too slow and the bomber might spot him.
Night fighters relied on surprise.
Once the enemy knew you were there, everything changed.
Bomber crews would take evasive action.
Gunners would open fire.
The clean intercept would turn into a dog fight.
At 500 yd, Smith saw the Betty clearly.



