From the early days of fighting this tank in World War II to the present day, the Tiger’s fame extends equally to its actual development history, its combat performance, and its fan base. It is a tank with many flaws and one whose mystique, even during World War II, was disproportionate to its usefulness and use as a fighting vehicle. Yet despite its flaws and problems, the tank remains a potent symbol of World War II, and for many, it is the tank that gave them their introduction to the world of armored fighting vehicles.

The Tiger, as described in a 1944 report by the British School of Tank Technology (STT), The white plate on the front left corner identifies this vehicle as “131”, which was captured in Tunisia and brought to Great Britain for extensive research. Source: STT Report 1944
The Tiger I or ”  Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausführung E  ” (Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E) was launched in May 1942, but its conception and development can be traced directly back to 1936 and 1937, when the Henschel and Son firm of Kassel was working on a 30-33 ton tank. The vehicle itself was a relatively hasty development, prompted by the shock of encountering the Soviet KV-1 heavy tank and T-34 medium tank after Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet Union) in 1941. The Tiger was intended to be superior to these tanks, not equal to them. The vehicle combined elements from the development of other heavy tanks in the 30- and 36-ton class of the   DW series   by Henschel und Sohn GmbH of Kassel with the turret and gun design of Fried Krupp AG of Essen from the 45-ton tank project of Dr.-Ing. hcF Porsche KG of Stuttgart.
As with other German tank projects, the development is highly complex, overlapping with dozens of other projects and being the subject of numerous books and films. The name ‘Tiger’ itself is no less complex. It goes back to the  Waffen-Prüfungsamt (Weapons Testing Office). 6, which was responsible for tank design and first used the name in February 1942, calling the project “Pz.Kpfw.VI (VK45.01/H) Ausf.H1 (Tiger)”. The design was from then on clearly identified as Pz.Kpfw. VI or Tiger, with the “Tiger I” first being fielded on 15 October 1942, followed by the “Pz.Kpfw.VI H Ausf.H1 (Tiger H1) on 1 December 1942” and finally by the “Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E” in March 1943.

Evolution of the Tiger tank development. Adapted by the author from Jentz and Doyle

Development and design

There were several key steps in the development of this vehicle that must be considered, as they determined the tank’s utility, armament, and ultimately, its appearance. No discussion of the Tiger can ignore these steps, as they are fundamental to understanding why the Tiger became what it is.
Although the development of a heavy tank can be traced back to 1937, the Tiger itself is a product of the sudden encounter with the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 tanks following the invasion of the Soviet Union. The need to surpass these tanks was urgent, so several areas of development and testing had to be rushed or simply ignored. Since much of the heavy tank development had already been completed with tanks in the 30- and 36-ton class, and a tank had to be ready for action quickly, the Tiger was somewhat of an accidental design.
The Tiger I therefore used many components originally developed for other tanks. These included parts from the VK36.01 (  Vollkettenkraftfahrzeug   , 36 ton, construction number 1) such as the steering gear, axle drives, suspension, shock absorbers, bump stops, idler wheel, disc wheels (development of the new wheels was delayed, so these had to be used instead), and drive sprockets. Furthermore, the forged one-piece wheel arms, idler wheel (without rubber tires and fitted with an armored steel hub), and guide axles from the VK30.01(H) were used, although the guide axles were omitted to prevent breakage. The
previous heavy tanks of the 30- and 36-ton classes were insufficiently armored, and after May 1941, it was decided that production heavy tanks from 1942 onwards would require at least 100 mm of frontal and 60 mm of side armor. In addition, a heavy tank capable of destroying enemy tanks required a larger gun capable of penetrating enemy armor.
With the planned increase in armor and firepower, the tank’s weight also increased, making bridging more difficult. Consequently, the tank had to wade through small water obstacles, which in turn required an increase in fording capability to allow the vehicle to operate submerged for short periods. This requirement applied to a water depth of 4.5 m and, along with the required track shield, necessitated the development or modification of numerous new components for this VK45.01(H) tank (45-ton experimental vehicle with full track drive, design number 1 from Henschel). These included:

• Watertight engine deck and compartment to a depth of 4.5 m (pressure: 145,424 Pascal)
• Engine exhaust and transmission cooling system
• Turret drive (from the main drive shaft)
• Fuel system with 4 fuel tanks (submersible to a depth of 4.5 m) with a capacity of 348 liters, including an 8 mm thick armor plate over the upper fuel tanks in the hull
• Telescopic air intake pipe
• New shock absorbers and bump stops for the first and last wheels
• Storage space for 92 rounds of 8.8 cm ammunition
• Tool holder (inside and outside)
• Radio installation – FuG 5 radio as standard for all vehicles and FuG 2 also for platoon commander vehicles (FuG – radio)
• Hydraulic pump and piping for the armored shield
• Bilge pump system (for removing water underwater)
• To cope with the new weight of 58 tons, a third rubber-tired wheel will be added to each axle (previously two).
• The original 520 mm wide tracks, which were separate for the left and right sides, were standardized into a single 725 mm wide  Marsh track  for both sides to accommodate the increased weight. This caused wear problems, as the track resistance was different on each side of the tank. Additionally, a second set of tracks was required for transport (515 mm wide  loading tracks  ) to fit on a railcar. (The four outermost road wheels on each side also had to be removed.)
• Changes to the steering gear of the L600C (from VK36.01) to eliminate the smallest turning radii (now a planetary gear with double radius)

Despite the necessary modifications, prototype production began on January 3, 1942, with the delivery of the first VK45.01(H) hull (  hull no. 1  ) from Krupp to Henschel. This was followed on April 11, 1942, by the first turret (  turret no. 1  ), fitted with an 8.8 cm Kw.K.36 no. 1 gun. Four days later, on April 15, hull no. 1 and turret no. 1 were joined to form the first vehicle. On April 17, the prototype was completed, 40 minutes ahead of schedule, with engineers and technicians working around the clock. Just in time, it was loaded onto a trailer and taken to a local railroad yard. From there, it was transported by train to the test site on the 19th, just in time for a demonstration and inspection by Hitler on his birthday (April 20). However, the rush to assemble parts from lighter vehicles led to a number of mechanical problems, including slipping clutches, overheated radiators, and improperly adjusted brakes. Despite these problems, the VK45.01(H) was chosen over the competing VK45.01(P) (experimental vehicle with full track drive, 45 tons, Porsche design number 1).

Tiger I chassis no. 250001 (the first hull to enter production) during testing by Wa Pruef 6 in May 1942. During testing, the steering mechanism was damaged. Source: Jentz and Doyle.

Early Tiger hull during testing, fitted with a ballast weight to simulate the weight of the turret. On the deck, in uniform, stands Albert Speer (Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production) in conversation with Ferdinand Porsche (hat and coat). This tank was a competitor to Porsche’s own design, the VK45.01(P). Source: Willey, Hayton and Vase.
The second hull of the VK.45.01(H) (  Hull No. 2  ) was delivered (without the turret) to the Kummersdorf proving ground in May 1942 for testing, and these tests also revealed serious technical problems. Despite the vehicle’s problems, the design was approved by Hitler, and 200 units were ordered, even though components had not been adequately tested and modifications had been made to address them. The second turret (  Turret No. 2  ), to be attached to hull No. 2, was not delivered to Henschel for testing until late May 1942. Tests of hull No. 2 and a third prototype took place in June and July 1942, and the report of July 13, 1942, again showed serious deficiencies in the final drives, exhaust, and transmission.
The haste to put the tank into service later proved to be the Tiger I’s Achilles heel, which was plagued by numerous mechanical failures due to overstressed components throughout its service life. Nevertheless, the Tiger I was intended to serve as a temporary solution while work continued on a new heavy tank to replace it. The designers probably had no idea that the vehicle they were about to put into service would become a legend.

Cutaway view of the Tiger’s key features. Source: Scheibert

production

Even before testing began, 200 VK45.01(H) vehicles were ordered in April 1942, followed by 124 more in August of the same year, even after the first disappointing demonstration. Despite the serious problems encountered during testing, the need for such a heavy tank (illustrated by encounters with the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 following the invasion of the Soviet Union) outweighed the problems to be solved, and it entered series production in late 1942. The production rate gradually increased, peaking at 104 and 100 vehicles in April and May 1944, respectively, when production actually exceeded production targets. It was only with the introduction of the Tiger II that production began to be switched to this vehicle, while production of the Tiger I was gradually phased out. The last six Tiger I tanks rolled off the assembly line in August 1944.
Tiger production largely proceeded on schedule, although Allied bombing raids in October 1943 disrupted production and delivery plans. In November 1943, some worker sabotage was also uncovered, affecting a number of vehicles. In total, approximately 1,350 vehicles were completed with factory serial numbers starting with 250001 (the first production tub), including 1,346 production vehicles and four prototypes. However, official figures from Henschel state that of the 1,376 ordered, 1,348 (98% of production) were built. Among the last 54 of these vehicles were some converted vehicles that had been significantly damaged in combat and returned to the factory for repair and modernization. This means that exact production figures may vary depending on the source. After the Henschel factory was captured by US troops on April 4, 1945, no further Tigers could be converted or built. The production cost of each Tiger was calculated at 250,800 RM (Reichsmarks), compared to only 117,100 RM for a Panther and 103,462 RM for a Panzer IV.

Dr. Erwin Aders (front right), the chief designer of the VK45.01(H), leads high-ranking German army officers through the Henschel factory, 5 September 1942. Source: Willey, Hayton and Vase.
The Tiger was both simple and complex to manufacture. The use of large, flat plates for the body maximized the available internal volume but also simplified production by eliminating much of the machining associated with large castings or more complex shapes. Despite this, production of a single vehicle took approximately 14 days from start to finish. It is worth noting, however, that the hulls were delivered pre-welded by Krupp or the Dortmund-Hörder-Hüttenverein (DHHV) to the Henschel factory in Kassel, as Henschel lacked the equipment to weld or form the heavy armor on the hull or turret. The turrets were prepared by the nearby Wegmann Waggonfabrik AG and then brought to Henschel for assembly.

Once the welded hulls arrived at Henschel, one of the tasks required was drilling the holes for the suspension. The hole for the turret ring was then machined in the roof on a vertical lathe. Sources: Spielberger or Federal Archives Image 1101L-635-3965-34

crew

The Tiger I crew consisted of five men: commander (rear left), gunner (front left), and loader (right) in the turret, as well as driver and radio operator in the front left and right of the hull. Originally, Tiger crews were to be hand-picked from the best students at tank schools  and  take trips to the Henschel factories to learn about production and preventative maintenance. However, as the war progressed, crews became younger, less experienced, and less well-trained. The main training center for Tiger crews was the barracks of Panzer Regiment 11 in Paderborn and Senne, with a tank firing school on the coast near Putlos.

Crews of the s.Pz.Abt 508 conduct firing exercises with a Tiger of Panzer-Ersatz- Ausbildungs-Abteilung 500 at the Senne camp, June 1943. Source: Schneider

armor

A heavy tank required heavy armor protection to fulfill its role, and given the strength of Soviet tanks like the KV-1, the new tank had to be superior in both armor and firepower. For protection reasons, it was decided in May 1941 that Porsche and Henschel would have to produce vehicles with at least 100 mm of frontal armor and 60 mm of side armor starting in 1942.
Mounting an 8.8 cm gun required significant structural modifications to the vehicle, which were completed by Henschel in July 1941 with drawing number HSK J2209, titled ”  Cooling Space  with Enlarged Radiator.” This design extended the outriggers on both sides over the tracks the entire length of the tank hull, while creating sufficient new space in the rear engine compartment for cooling fans and radiators. In the fighting compartment, this additional space was to be used for ammunition storage, but also to house the cooling fans. The tops of the tank were to be 80 mm thick and the sides of the lower hull (behind the tracks) 60 mm thick. A side effect of adopting this wider hull was that track idlers were no longer required. From this point on, the superstructure had to be welded together to support these new side sections. This abandoned the older method of welding the lower half of the vehicle and bolting a superstructure to it. This new upper structure was still bolted to the lower hull, but angle sections of armor steel were welded over the joints. This was to replace the use of welded interlocking plates, although the hull side plates continued to be interlocked with the lower front and rear plates. However, the turret was not completed until September 1941, when Wa. Prüf. 6 ordered that the turret designed by Krupp for Prof. Porsche’s tank be adopted for the Henschel vehicle.
At the same time, Wa. Prüf. When the German Wehrmacht commissioned Henschel in May 1941 to redesign the VK.45.01(H) for a turret with an 8.8 cm Kw.K cannon and improved armor protection, additional protection of the tracks and drive wheels by an armored shield was also required. With this new turret with 8.8 cm armor, the nomenclature of the tank was changed in due course to “Tiger H1” (  VK45.01 – Aufbau für 8.8 cm Kw.K. Krupp-Turm  ).
The proposed armored shield should be able to be lowered over the front of the tracks to protect them from fire, and when driving or off-road, the shield should be able to be raised so as not to be in the way. After the tank’s demonstration to Hitler in April 1942, this hydraulically operated shield, known as   the Vorpanzer  , officially abandoned. Firing tests indicate that the plate may have broken off, which could have caused the vehicle to become stuck. Removing the   Vorpanzer  also saved weight and reduced design complexity, as the hydraulics could also be removed. One note about the   Vorpanzer   that is often overlooked is that the glacis plate extended above the top of the sprocket, thus providing complete protection over the tracks at the front. When the   Vorpanzer   was abandoned, the glacis was shortened in these areas to just the width of the lower hull, with two short stub extensions just forward of the support fins.

PzKpfw VI Tiger Ausf. H1 seen at the Henschel factory in April 1942, with the Vorpanzer armored skirt in the folded-up position. Source: Anderson

Hull of DHHV with the front armor before and after firing trials on April 30, 1942. Note the cutouts in the glacis extension that allow the hydraulic actuators to move the shield. Source: Jentz and Doyle (left) and STT report 1944 (right)
Despite the loss of the   front armor  , the Tiger I still had impressive armor for 1941, with a 100 mm thick driver’s plate sloped rearward at 9º, a 100 mm thick nose plate sloped 25º, a 60 mm long glacis sloped 80º, 80 mm thick vertical upper hull sides, 60 mm thick vertical lower hull sides, and an 80 mm thick rear plate sloped 9º. The roof and belly plates were 25 mm thick. Further protection consisted of a bulletproof vision block for the driver with an armored steel hatch and bulletproof vision blocks in the commander’s cupola, which ranged in thickness from 50 to 80 mm. It is also worth noting that some thickness variations of up to 2 mm over specification were found due to plate manufacturing variations.
The turret front consisted of two 100 mm thick bars welded into the slots of the round turret plate. These were angled rearward by 5º from the vertical. The gun mantlet covering the turret front consisted of a single plate ranging in thickness from 85 mm to 200 mm. This was improved by the manufacturer (DHHV) in the cannon area from vehicle number 41 onwards. About halfway through production, this gun mantlet also had a reinforcing armor block added around the holes for the gunner’s sight. The rounded sides and rear sections of the turret consisted of a single 80 mm thick vertical plate fitted into the front plate. Although the turret was curved, it was not cast but manufactured as a flat armor plate and then bent into a horseshoe shape.

A huge press at the Krupp factory bends the horseshoe of the Tiger I turret into shape. Source: Pinterest
Early turrets had two rear submachine gun ports, but in December 1942 the rear right port was replaced by a large, round escape hatch, although the rear left port remained. Like the hull roof, the turret roof was 25 mm thick, but the leading edge was 40 mm. By September 1943, the 25 mm thick turret roof was deemed inadequate, as artillery and ground-attack aircraft fire could penetrate it. Therefore, from March 1944, it was replaced by a uniform 40 mm thick roof (a British report examining a disabled Tiger in May 1944 found a roof thickness of 45 mm). Vehicles overhauled after this date had to be upgraded to this standard. This roof modification altered the commander’s cupola, and the loading hatch was replaced with the one originally designed for the Tiger II to accommodate this thicker roof. From April 1944, wooden planks were fitted over the upper fuel tanks to catch shrapnel and bullet fragments, thus preserving the engine radiators.

Armor layout of the early Tiger I with a 25 mm roof before it was upgraded to 40 mm in September 1943.
Source: Willey, Hayton, and Vase.
Unlike other German tanks with hardened surface armor, the Tiger used homogeneous armor (armor with uniform hardness across its entire thickness) for its main armor plates. These plates had a high content of chromium and molybdenum, but also carbon (a contaminant that made welding difficult). A British report from September 1943 on captured Tiger tanks shows that the armor quality was considered equivalent to that of machined armor plates of the same thickness, and that the construction method, using a combination of keyed, overlapping, and stepped interlocking armor plates, improved the strength of the joints. On the other hand, the report also identified the exposed turret ring as a weak point of the design. Cast armor elements included the cupola and gun mantlet of the late model.

armor

The main armament consisted of the 8.8 cm Kw.K. 36 L/56 cannon in the turret. This cannon was derived from the 8.8 cm Flak 18 and Flak 36 guns and delivered similar ballistic performance. The first discussion about the use of this 8.8 cm cannon came from Hitler in May 1941, while at the same time the use of the 7.5 cm Waffe 0725 cannon with a conical barrel was being considered. The use of the smaller caliber cannon would allow the carry of more ammunition, but would have been dependent on tungsten stocks to produce shell penetration. Because tungsten is a strategically important material, this idea was abandoned in July 1941.
The 7.5 cm Kw.K. Kanone Rheinmetall’s L/70 (which could penetrate 100 mm of armor at 30º/1000 m) continued to be considered as an alternative, but in May 1941, Wa. Prüf. 6 placed a contract for the redesign of Henschel’s VK.45.01(H) to equip one turret with the 8.8 cm Kw.K cannon and provide the required improved armor protection. In July 1941, Krupp received    contract SS006-4467/41  from Wa. Prüf. 6 for three complete turrets ( Krupp turret with 8.8 cm Kw.K. L/56 for Ausf. H1  ) from the VK.45.01(P) program, which were to be sent to Henschel for mounting on the VK.45.01(H). To accommodate this new, larger (turret ring with an inner diameter of 1,850 mm), and heavier turret and the 8.8 cm gun, minor modifications were required, including switching from electric to hydraulic turret drive, new linkages, sight mounts, stowage space, blower, and the platform. In July 1942, the Panzer Commission abandoned the idea of replacing the 8.8 cm Kw.K. L/56 with the 7.5 cm Kw.K. L/70 gun, as new armor-piercing shells for the 8.8 cm gun could now achieve the required performance (100 mm at 30º/1,000 m). There were even plans to switch from the L/56 gun to the longer L/71 gun by the end of the year. The introduction of the 8.8 cm gun also marked the end of the proposal for the   Rheinmetall turret with the 7.5 cm Kw.K. L/70   turret (Pz.Kpfw. Tiger Ausf. H2) for the VK.45.01, which was to be installed on the first 200 VK.45.01(H) vehicles (Series I). Model of the VK.45.01(H) hull with the 7.5 cm turret from Rheinmetall. This VK.45.01(H2) was discontinued as a concept in July 1942, as work continued on the VK.45.01(H1) with the 8.8 cm gun and corresponding turret. Source: Doyle/Jentz

The first 8.8 cm Kw.K.36 L/56 gun, manufactured by DHHV and Wolf Buchao, was tested, proof-fired, and accepted in January 1942. It was combined with the excellent Leitz TZF9b binocular sight (for the gunner) with 2.5x magnification (identifiable by a pair of holes on the left side of the gun mantlet). This TZF9b binocular sight was later replaced by the cheaper, but no less effective TZF9c monocular sight, recognizable by the change to a single hole on the left side of the gun mantlet.
In very early gun mantlets, the two holes in this area created a weak point with a ground-out depression on the inside, leaving only 70 mm of armor. This was later remedied by casting a large block externally in this area. When the monocular sight was introduced, older gun mantlets had a hole welded shut, and new ones with a hole were rolled out. Gun mantlets were a distinctive part that was often damaged by enemy fire and could be repaired or replaced. They are therefore not suitable for precise dating or identification. At least 12 different gun mantlet variants from various manufacturers are known.

Damage to the gunner’s sight area on the gun mantlet was no joke, as this vehicle shows after combat on the Eastern Front. Source: Krueger Horst on Flickr Thanks to
an SF14Z stereo binocular sight with 10x magnification (for the commander) and an EM34 coincidence rangefinder with 11x magnification, this weapon could deliver calibrated fire to a range of 4,000 m. When firing at a 2.5 m x 2 m target under test conditions at 1,000 m, this weapon delivered 100% accuracy, dropping to 87% at 2,000 m and 53% at 3,000 m, although the EM2 rangefinder could detect targets as far away as 10,000 m. A British test firing from a captured vehicle in 1944 reported that  the weapon “appeared remarkably consistent in terms of accuracy. A 5-round burst, aiming constantly at a screen at 1,100 m, was 100% accurate within a 406 mm x 457 mm area.”

The normal rate of fire of this weapon was estimated by the British after tests at 5 to 8 rounds per minute. In tests against a target moving at 24 km/h at a distance of 1,370 m, the weapon achieved a hit rate of 60% with slow gun aiming and manual traverse, as the rapid traverse reduced accuracy.
This gun was modified from April 1944 with the lighter muzzle brake of the 8.8 cm Kampfwagenkanone Model 43 (Kw.K.43) L/71 and an electric fuze system. The Tiger carried 92 rounds of armor-piercing (AP) and high-explosive (HE) ammunition, usually in the form of 50% Pz.Gr.39 APCBC-HE-T (armor-piercing, ballistic, high-explosive, tracer ammunition) with a small explosive charge and 50% Spr. Gr. (high explosive). Where available, the Pz.Gr.40 (high Velocity, sub-caliber, tungsten core, without explosive filling) for use against heavy enemy tanks. The Gr.39 HL, a shaped charge (HEAT) ammunition, was also available and could be used as a dual-purpose ammunition either against armored targets or in place of HE shells. The turret could be rotated 360 degrees, and the gun could be adjusted between 16 degrees of elevation and 7 degrees of depression.

The 92 rounds of 8.8 cm ammunition occupied much of the interior space on the sides and in the stanchions of the Tiger. Source: STT Report 1944.
The secondary armament consisted of a 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr  34 (MG.34) machine gun, mounted coaxially with the main gun and operated by a floor-mounted firing pedal. This coaxial weapon had a maximum elevation angle of -8 to +15. A second machine gun, an  armor-jacketed MG.34  in a ball mount , was located on the right side of the driver’s plate. This second machine gun could be swiveled 15º to the left and right (total arc of 30º) and had an aiming angle of -7 to +20. This machine gun was equipped with a KZF2 episcopic telescopic sight with a magnification of x1.75. 4,500 rounds of ammunition were carried for these machine guns. This amount was increased to 4,800 rounds after February 1944. Another MG34 anti-aircraft machine gun (  Flieger-MG  ) could also be carried on the turret (also mounted on the   Tiger command vehicle  ).
From June 1942, the mounting of six 95 mm diameter smoke grenade launchers (in two sets of three) on the turret was permitted, a process that began in August 1942. The launchers could fire 90 mm Nb.K.39 smoke grenade launchers, but according to combat reports, in which to avoid explosions caused by gunfire and blinding the crews, they were dropped in June 1943.
To protect against enemy infantry climbing onto the vehicle, a close-range defense weapon called the   Nahverteidigungswaffe was   mounted from March 1944, although during Operation Citadel it was seen that some Tigers had also been fenced in with barbed wire for the same purpose. This weapon fired small explosive grenades (  Sprengranate Patrone 326 Lp  ) 7 to 10 meters at a fixed angle of 50º, exploding above the ground and holding enemy infantry at bay at ranges of up to 100 m. This weapon could also fire smoke grenades for camouflage or orange smoke for signaling. The crew also carried small arms, including the 9 mm MP38 or MP40 submachine guns, personal weapons, and a 27 mm Walther signal and grenade launcher pistol (  Kampfpistole  ) with 24 grenades (12 white, 6 red, and 6 green).


On Tiger I number 204 of sPzAbt 503, the turret can be removed using a 16-ton Strabokran gantry crane, highlighting one of the Tiger’s most important advantages over its Soviet tank rivals: the turret basket. This additional basket allowed the crew to operate, load, aim, and fire the weapon at all turret rotation angles. This capability was severely limited on Soviet tanks up to the IS-3, as they all lacked a turret basket, making operation considerably more difficult for the crews. Note that this vehicle is coated with Zimmerit. Source: Tiger im Focus

Motor

In early production runs, the Tiger was powered by the HL 210 TRM P45 21-liter V12 Maybach petrol engine, producing 650 hp at 3,000 rpm. Due to reliability problems with this engine, maximum power could not be achieved, limiting the mobility of this heavy tank. However, the reliability problems appear to have been due to engine overload rather than a design flaw – a 1944 British examination of an HL 210 reported that ”  paintwork and finish  were of a high quality throughout.” A report by German Tank Maintenance in WW2 (US Army 1952), examining the reliability of the HL 210, suggests that the problem was actually a lack of spare parts and maintenance facilities.
However, due to its poor performance, the more powerful HL 230 TRM P45 23-liter V12 Maybach engine, producing 700 hp, was introduced instead from May 1943. Maybach’s Hochleistungsmotor (HL)  engine series  included the engines (P – ” Panzermotor  “) with dry sump lubrication and  Schnappermagne   (TRM) developed specifically for tank use. The development of the HL series tank engines has a long history with a non-linear numbering system for the various engine outputs. The HL 210 dates from 1941 and is a 12-cylinder petrol engine with a bore of 125 mm and a stroke of 145 mm. The HL 230 was a further development of this engine but with a larger bore of 130 mm, which reduced the engine’s efficiency from 31 hp per liter to 30.4 hp per liter – a small price to pay for a 50 hp increase in power.
Although the HL 230 was more powerful than the HL 210, a post-war survey by Dr. Stieler von Heydekampf (President of the Panzer Commission) stated that the HL 230 never produced more than 600 hp, possibly due to a power limit to extend engine life or because Heydekampf was simply mistaken.

Maybach HL 210 TRM P45 (left) and HL 230 TRM P45 (right). Problems with the maximum power of the HL 210 led to the development of the HL 230, which provided the Tiger with much-needed engine power. Source: STT Report 36X, 1944 (left) and Spielberger (right)
These engines transmitted power to the final drives via a Maybach Olvar 40-12-16 semi-automatic hydraulic transmission with 8 forward and 4 reverse gears (two versions were produced, Model A and Model B). From April 1944, when the Maybach factory was destroyed in an Allied bombing raid, production of the HL 230 P45 engine was transferred from Maybach in Friedrichshafen to Auto-Union in Chemnitz. The use of the HL 230 engine instead of the HL 210 required some minor modifications to the engine compartment, including a hatch in the underbody plate to access the generator and fuel pumps. The HL 230 was later used in the Tiger II tank and, thanks to design improvements, was capable of producing 800 hp (at least on paper) by mid-1945, although it is not known whether it was installed in the Tiger I.

The engine and air filter were located at the rear, and the transmission and final drives were at the front. Due to the location of the gearbox, it was necessary to remove the turret. Source: STT report 1944.
One modification to the engine for use in North Africa was the addition of the Feifel air filter system to combat the fine sand. Tigers converted in this way were designated the tropicalized “Tp” variant, although this modification was discontinued after the fall of Tunisia in the spring of 1943. During British tests in 1945, the Tiger with the HL 230 engine was measured at 34.6 km/h on the road and about 24 km/h off-road, despite the engine’s power being only 592 hp.

suspension

The Tiger’s suspension consisted of  55 mm diameter bar springs  with splined ends running the width of the tank’s hull, with the two forward and rearmost bars being wider than the rest at 58 mm diameter. Apart from the forwardmost bar in front of the driver (which was covered by a metal hatch), all the bars in the tank were located under a false floor. The bars were connected to the road wheels  ,  each of which had three road wheels. Their arrangement overlapped the wheels of adjacent road wheels, creating an interlaced pattern to distribute the tank’s load onto the track. Hydraulic shock absorbers were fitted to the inside of the front and rear road wheels, which, together with the damping effect of the bar spring, provided a very smooth ride. On early production Tiger models, these wheels had rubber rims and a small, slightly concave camber. As the rubber shortage worsened during the war, these were replaced with more durable, reinforced steel wheels, which were introduced in January 1944.

A worker at the Henschel factory works on one of the early wheels for the Tiger, offering an excellent view of the complex, interlocking wheels on the side of the Tiger. The outer four wheels on each side were to be removed for rail transport to reduce the width. Source: Federal Archives Image. 101L-635-3965-28

Changes

Like any major weapon system, the Tiger I was continually modified during its service, with minor upgrades to the engine, transmission, final drives, and other components to improve reliability and performance. The original requirement to be submersible was abandoned on August 30, 1943, to increase production speed, although the Tiger was still capable of fording water up to 1.5 m deep. In August 1942, the starter motor and coolant were modified for cold weather, and from September, heaters for the crew were fitted to withstand the terrible cold of the Russian winter. However, some of these heaters were later removed as they posed a fire hazard.
New tracks with cast lugs for better traction in snow (  Rutschschutzpickein  ) were available from October 1943, improved (welded) road wheels from June, and a smaller idler wheel  (  600 mm instead of 700 mm), introduced from February 1944, gradually improved the Tiger I’s off-road capability. The rear idler wheel also served to tension the tracks. Ten spare track links and pins were normally carried along with the crew’s equipment in a stowage box at the rear of the turret (not provided on early vehicles). A further 12 spare track links were often carried on the lower forward hull plate and later on special mounts welded to the turret sides.
Other modifications were sometimes made in the field, such as the addition of searchlights to the fenders. The vulnerability of the turret ring to enemy fire had been a concern, and in January 1943, Wa. Prüf. 6 ordered a study for an 80 mm thick turret joint protector  capable  of stopping 7.5 cm HE shells. However, this did not enter series production on the Tigers until February 1944.
One notable modification that was planned but not implemented was the replacement of the round hatches for the fuselage crew. Egress from these hatches could be difficult in an emergency, as they were offset from the driver’s or radio operator’s position and opened upwards and sideways. Therefore, depending on their position, these hatches could easily come into contact with the barrel of the 8.8 cm gun. A blueprint from June 1943 shows this hatch modification plan, with the driver’s hatch recut into a large oval shape. This new shape would allow for a swing-open hatch directly above the driver. Why the plan does not show the recuts of both crew hatches is unclear, but it is possible that it simply shows both types for comparison purposes, or that for some unspecified reason, only the replacement of one hatch was planned. Either way, the plan was not carried out.

Plan for modifying the crew hatch on the fuselage for Tiger I, taken from drawings
HSK J2877 dated August 27, 1942, and HSK3432 dated June 26, 1943. Note: The images have been cropped and digitally enhanced.

camouflage

Originally (the first 120 to 150 examples), Tiger tanks were painted in the standard color gray (  Dark Gray   RAL 7021), although those destined for the Russian Front were often (probably after delivery) whitewashed to camouflage them in the snow.

Tiger of s.Pz.Abt.502, early 1943. This unit used a unique mix of white with exposed “wedge-shaped” gray patches. Source: Schneider
Other Tigers delivered to the Russian Front by the end of 1943 were painted in the two-tone ”  Tropen” pattern of brown (  RAL   8020) and gray (  RAL   7027). The vehicles sent to North Africa, the “Tropentigers,” were also painted in the two-tone “Tropen” pattern of brown (  RAL   8020) and gray  (   RAL 7027) before shipment.
From February 1943, Tigers were regularly    camouflaged in the field with green ( olive green   RAL 6003) and reddish brown (  reddish brown RAL 8017). From August 1943, the Tigers were coated with Zimmerit paste at the factory before being delivered with their regular camouflage. After the whitewash was removed, the underlying camouflage had to be repainted. Here, a crew member applies a new layer of camouflage paint to their Tiger with a spray gun. Source: Schneider

Deployment and combat

The first unit to be equipped with the Tiger was the 1st Company of the sPzAbt 502, which received four vehicles in August 1942 while serving on the Leningrad Front. The terrain in their area of operations was completely unsuitable for the Tigers, as they sank into soft, swampy, and densely wooded terrain. As a result, they were easily attacked by Soviet anti-tank gunners and repeatedly hit. Although none of the hits penetrated their armor, the vulnerability of these tanks to soft ground and precise fire was demonstrated. Three vehicles were disabled either by mechanical failure, becoming stuck in the mud, or by enemy fire destroying their tracks. These vehicles subsequently had to be recovered—a difficult task for such a heavy tank—and repairs were necessary. One vehicle, deemed unrecoverable, was eventually recovered and blown up. Reinforcements in the form of more Tigers were brought in for another attack.

One of the first four Tigers to see action in August 1942 was disabled by ground and determined Soviet anti-tank fire. Source: Kleine and Kuhn
The impact of the Tiger was truly felt during the Soviet offensive in 1943. Although no more than seven Tigers were in operation at any one time, they accounted for almost a quarter of all Soviet tank losses. This is hardly surprising, as the Soviet 76mm F-34 tank gun could not even penetrate the Tiger’s side or rear armor. The first major combat use of the Tiger I came in July 1943 during Operation Citadel near Kursk, when 146 Tigers were deployed.

Tiger, which belonged to s.Pz.Abt. 505 before Operation Citadel and was covered with barbed wire to prevent Soviet infantry from climbing the vehicles. Source: Schneider
Tigers were eventually deployed to ten Wehrmacht heavy tank battalions, one training battalion, and three SS heavy tank battalions. The SS Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland received a single Tiger company (later expanded to a unit). These units saw action on the East, West, and North African fronts. Theoretically, a Tiger-equipped heavy tank battalion consisted of five companies, including a staff company. Each company had a staff section and three platoons of four Tigers each, for a total of 59 Tigers per battalion. This number was later reduced to 45 Tigers per battalion (staff platoon with three Tigers, three companies with two staff Tigers, and three platoons with four tanks each). However, even with a reduction to 45, each battalion was rarely fully staffed in practice.

The Tiger I belonged to the Panzer Division Großdeutschland after its expansion from one company to three companies (designated Companies A, B and C) sometime in April 1943 on the Eastern Front. Source: Anderson
The intensity of the fighting in which the Tiger was often involved is clearly evident in the combat report of Lt. Zbel (s.Pz.Abt. 503) after the operations near the town of Ssermernikovo.
Kampfgruppe Sander faced very strong opposition during the attack on the collective farm west of Ssermernikovo. The Tiger, attacking as the vanguard, left the lighter tanks behind and drew all the enemy fire. The tanks took hits in the front and on the right flank. The enemy opened fire from long range with tanks, anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles. My Tiger took a 7.62 cm hit on the front of the driver’s cab. The spare track links, attached there with an iron bar, were torn off. We noticed a bang and slight vibrations inside the tank. The closer we got, the stronger the blows and vibrations from the 7.62 cm hits became. At the same time, we noticed considerable dust clouds from artillery ground impacts near the tank. Further back, the crew heard a somewhat fainter bang, followed by a cloud of yellow smoke, most likely a hit from an anti-tank rifle.
A short time later, a 4.5 cm anti-tank gun hit our cupola. The armored glass mounts were shattered. The viewing block jammed and became opaque due to the heat of the blast. Another hit destroyed the mounts, and the hatch fell into the turret. Thick smoke formed in the fighting compartment, and the area became very hot. The loading hatch was jammed and slightly open. It received several hits from anti-tank rifles, destroying its hinges and mounts.
After the battle, two hits from 4.5 cm anti-tank guns and 15 hits from anti-tank rifles were recorded on the cupola. On both days of the attack, the enemy destroyed our machine guns. The smoke mortars on the turret were also destroyed. The smoke in the turret caused such severe problems that the Tigers were temporarily unusable. The nerves of all crew members were frayed, and we lost track of time. We felt neither hunger nor any other desires. Although the attack lasted over six hours, every man in the tank felt as if the time had flown by.
After another 7.62 cm gun hit the gun mantlet, the gun’s mounting screws tore off. The recoil brake leaked fluid, and the gun barrel remained in the rear (retracted) position. Due to electrical problems, the breech wouldn’t close. Vibrations from further hits knocked out the radio system and jammed the steering levers. When the exhaust cover was destroyed, the engine caught fire. This fire was extinguished by the fire extinguishing system. In addition, part of the turret ring bolts came loose. The turret oscillation temporarily failed…
We counted 227 hits from anti-tank rifles, 14 hits from 5.7 cm anti-tank guns, and 11 hits from 7.62 cm anti-tank guns. The right wheel suspension was severely damaged by the shelling. The connecting pieces of several road wheels were destroyed, two torsion bars were broken, and a rear idler bearing was damaged.
Despite the damage, the Tiger was able to travel another 60 km. The hits caused cracks in some welds. One fuel tank began to leak due to the heavy impacts. We noticed some impacts on the track links, but these didn’t significantly affect mobility.
In summary, the Tiger’s armor met our expectations.”

Tiger I number 231, owned by Leutnant Zabel of s.Pz.Abt. 503, was involved in heavy fighting near the town of Ssemernikovo, where it sustained no fewer than 252 hits from various weapons, including Soviet 7.62 cm and 4.5 cm anti-tank guns. It remained operational and later drove 60 km back to base. The damage to this vehicle is as much a testament to the determination of the crews who operated some Tigers, the intensity of the fighting, and the resolve of the Soviet troops as it is to the Tiger’s armor. The vehicle was later depicted in the manual for Tiger crews known as the “Tiger Primer.” Source: Anderson.
Despite such incidents, which were obviously exploited to the utmost by the Nazi propaganda machine, the Tiger was not the invulnerable beast in combat that many believed at the time, and some still do today. In fact, Lieutenant Zabel’s experience appears to have been largely due to luck, as the Soviet 7.62 cm anti-tank gun, fired with sub-caliber ammunition, could have penetrated frontal armor at close range and from the sides at about 700 m. As Soviet guns and ammunition improved throughout the war, the already excellent Soviet guns increasingly affected even these heavy German tanks. If anything, Lieutenant Zabel’s exploits may have helped instill false confidence in the Tiger crews, and by the end of 1943, the Tiger was far from invincible. The

Tiger, commanded by Staff Sergeant Leichauer, was destroyed in the Tarnopol area on April 20, 1944. A shell from a Soviet SU-152 hit the turret’s escape hatch, killing the commander and gunner (left). The radio operator and driver had just ejected when the vehicle was hit again (right) by a 122 mm shell from a Soviet IS-2, which caused burns to the loader who remained in the tank. Despite the severe damage to this vehicle, three of the five crew members escaped. Source: Kleine and Kuhn.
Following the British success at El Alamein in North Africa in November 1942, Tiger tanks were sent to Tunisia to reinforce the German and Italian forces. The first three vehicles arrived at the port of Bizerte on November 23; a total of 20 vehicles were deployed. They made their combat debut in North Africa on December 1, 1942, in an engagement with M3 Lee tanks near the town of Djerdeida. The dense olive groves meant that engagement distances were very short, often less than 100 meters, causing the Tigers to sustain many hits on their weaker side armor. Despite “deep penetrations” (70 mm deep into the 80 mm side armor), they were successful, claiming the destruction of two M3 Lees as their first success.
This action was followed by attacks on the American forces between Djerdeida and Tebourba, in which a total of four anti-tank guns, six Stuart light tanks (M3 and M5), two M3 half-tracks, and various soft-armored vehicles, as well as an unknown number of men, were destroyed. Three Panzer IIIs were lost, but none of the Tigers. One Tiger was destroyed at Djerdeida, not due to enemy fire, but rather due to the long march. The isolated use of Tigers without adequate protection from troops, artillery, and other tanks almost proved disastrous, but the Allied forces in North Africa had encountered the German Tiger and suffered a heavy defeat as a result.

Tiger I of 2/s.Pz.Abt. 501 in North Africa, with the muzzle cover attached and several gasoline canisters on the turret front. These would not be used in combat as they would have obscured the commander’s line of sight and left them completely exposed to enemy fire, posing a significant fire hazard to the tank. Source: Anderson
Another defeat for US armored forces occurred on December 10, 1942, during the attack on Medjez el Bab, when five Tigers (two were out of action due to maintenance) were sent to the rear to counterattack US forces harassing the German artillery. Here, the Tiger forces encountered 20 to 25 Stuart light tanks (M3 and M5), destroying 12 of them without suffering any casualties. Further US losses resulted from German guns of the 7th Panzer Regiment.
The M3’s hull-mounted 75mm gun had nearly penetrated the Tiger’s side armor at Djerdeida, but the Stuart’s 37mm gun was ineffective against the heavy tank, although crews considered it highly accurate and capable of damaging the Tiger’s cupola. On one occasion, it even jammed a Tiger’s turret with a shot to the turret ring.
The turret ring was indeed an underestimated weak point in the design, as discovered by Lieutenant Zabel in Russia, who suffered turret ring damage. Here, in North Africa, damage to the vulnerable turret ring would produce the most famous Tiger of all.

Tiger 131 is examined by British forces after its capture at Gueriat el Atach in April 1943. Source: The Tank Museum.
Orders issued in July 1943 prohibited the enemy from capturing a Tiger tank. Crews were expected to destroy the vehicle rather than allow it to fall into enemy hands. From February 1943, the self-destruction equipment (  explosive cartridges Z85 ) issued. However, in an engagement on 21 April 1943 at Gueriat el Atach, British forces from A Squadron, 4th Troop, 48th Royal Tank Regiment and 2nd Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, engaged two Tigers. During this engagement, the tanks, positioned behind the infantry providing fire support, hit one of the Tigers three times with AP shells from their 6-pounder guns. One of the shells ricocheted off the underside of the Tiger’s 8.8 cm gun and lodged in the turret ring, rendering the tank virtually useless. The crew, perhaps due to confusion, abandoned the tank and did not destroy it, so it fell into British hands virtually intact.

This was the first time the British had gotten their hands on this new German tank in good condition to examine, and it was soon returned to the UK for testing and evaluation. The vehicle still stands today in the Tank Museum in Bovington, England. One result of this encounter was the realization by many senior officers in Britain that Germany was fielding more and more heavily armored tanks and that the 6-pounder gun was insufficient. The need for heavy armor for the British Armored Forces, and a gun that could compete with heavy armor, had met with considerable resistance from the British High Command since 1940. Confronting a German tank with thicker armor, better mobility, and a larger and more powerful gun than any other in service was unpleasant news and fueled what could best be described as ‘tigerphobia’ among many in both the military and the political establishment.
sPz.Abt. 501 was deployed to Tunisia, but after losses in that theater, by May 1943 only the 2nd Company with nine Tiger tanks remained to protect the island of Sicily from the impending Allied invasion. By June 1943, this strength had grown to 17 Tigers, just in time for the July 1943 invasion. After landing, on July 11, s.Pz.Abt. 501 attacked the 1st US Infantry Division, where, despite Allied air attacks, it broke through the 26th US Infantry Regiment and made its way to the landing field at Gela. During a brief break to refuel and refuel, a vehicle was hit from behind, with the shell penetrating the emergency escape hatch in the turret. The vehicle was eventually blown up due to irreparable damage. This was the first Tiger loss in Sicily.
The next morning, they attacked a group of five Sherman tanks from a range of over 2 km, destroying four of them without taking any damage themselves. However, the advance was unsuccessful because the German forces had been withdrawn, leaving the Tiger unit stretched out on the way to Niscemi and under heavy artillery and mortar fire from three sides by US forces. Two Tigers were hit and immobilized and ambushed from a range of 600 m by a Sherman force. In this engagement, several Shermans were destroyed before the tanks withdrew, but the two damaged Tigers could not be recovered. Although the armor withstood over 100 hits from tanks, guns, and shellfire, the crews had no choice but to blow up these tanks and withdraw. This was a common sight for the rest of the Sicilian campaign: breakdowns, lost tracks, and the inability to recover a disabled vehicle meant that most of the vehicles had to be destroyed by their crews. The last remaining Tiger was evacuated by ferry across the Strait of Messina on August 17, as it could not stop the Allied attack.

The last of the 17 Tigers of s.Pz.Abt. 504 was transported from Sicily to the Italian mainland across the Strait of Messina on August 17, 1943. Source: Schneider.
In the second half of July 1944, the destroyed and now rebuilt s.Pz.Abt. 504 (reformed in the winter of 1943/44), re-equipped with Tigers, was deployed to halt the Allied advance around Rome after the fall of Monte Cassino (May 1944) and the landing at Anzio. Rail traffic was hampered by Allied air raids, and mechanical breakdowns of the tanks en route to their destination were a constant problem. Nevertheless, the s.Pz.Abt. 504 was relocated to the woods of San Vincenzo (on the coastal road from Rome to Pisa). From here, on June 21 and 22, 1944, the 1st Company of the s.Pz.Abt. 504 attacked the 362nd US Infantry Division, which was advancing north from Grosseto. Allied air raids and aircraft-guided artillery fire led to the abort of the operation before contact could be made. The tanks were too vulnerable, and they withdrew into the woods and mines of Massa Marittima. Here, however, they came into combat with an American unit consisting of 23 Shermans on June 22.   Oberfähnrich Oskar Rohrig  , commander of the 1st Company of Panzerabwehrabteilung 504, attacked and drove off this unit. He left 23 Shermans behind, twelve of them burning and eleven abandoned. This demonstrated that, when used carefully, the Tiger could inflict heavy damage on an enemy force.

A pair of Tigers at the Brenner Pass in 1943, a strategic point between Italy and Germany. Source: ixora.com
It was perhaps not the Tiger’s operations in Russia, Italy, or North Africa that received the most attention, but those in Normandy. After the Normandy landings (Operation Overlord) in June 1944, Allied forces encountered the Tiger, often in open terrain, but under more comparable conditions. The British had used the Sherman Firefly as a direct counter to tanks like the Tiger, wishing to avoid a repeat of the war in North Africa, where Allied guns were almost ineffective against heavy German armor.
Villers Bocage was the site of arguably the most famous Tiger incident, which was used after the war to paint a highly unflattering and inaccurate picture of the Tiger tank’s overall effectiveness. The circumstances of this incident are recounted in the report of the British 7th Armoured Division dated 13 June:
“At half past five the next morning, the advance through Briquessard and Amaye-sur-Seulles was resumed. Viller Bocage was entered without incident, although the 11th and 8th Hussar Regiments had encountered enemy action on either side of the centre line. A Squadron, 4th County of London Yeomanry, and A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade then advanced as planned to the high ground northeast of the town. In order to clear the traffic on the roads behind, the column had to advance in relatively close formation, which provided an opportunity for a Mk. VI [Tiger] tank, suddenly emerging from a side street. Its first shot destroyed a half-track of the Rifle Brigade, thus blocking the road; it then proceeded at its own discretion to destroy the remaining half-tracks, some Honey [M3 Stuart] tanks of the Reconnaissance Troop, four tanks of the Regimental staff troops and the two OP tanks [observation posts] that accompanied the squadron. Escape was impossible for the tanks, carriers, and half-tracks; the road was buried, obscured by flames and smoke from the burning vehicles, whose crews could only seek shelter from the machine-gun fire, and our own tanks were powerless against the Tiger’s armor, which offered unlimited cover. Meanwhile, ‘A’ Squadron, spearheaded by the Commanding Officer, was cut off. Its last radio message, received at 10:30, reported that it was completely surrounded by tanks and infantry, the position untenable, and withdrawal impossible. Relief was equally impossible because, in addition to the burning tanks and vehicles, the road was blocked by the same Mk.VI [Tiger], which dominated all approaches.
Luck, a well-chosen and concealed ambush position, and relatively poorly protected enemy forces on a constricted route gave the Tiger its most famous victory. Although production ceased in August 1944, the Tiger saw its last combat action of World War II in the desperate defense of Berlin in 1945. However, its glory days were over, as tanks like the Soviet IS-2 heavy tank, whose armor and firepower equaled that of the Tiger, were in large numbers in service. The accidentally deployed 1942 heavy tank was outclassed by a new generation of Soviet tanks and could no longer achieve the same effect in combat as it once had. At least one of the Tigers used in the defense of Berlin, along with a selection of captured tanks and prototypes, came from the Kummersdorf Proving Ground; desperate measures for desperate times.

Tiger I of Kampfgruppe “Kummersdorf” shortly after the fall of Berlin in May 1945 on Unter den Linden near the Brandenburg Gate. Source: Kolomyjec and Moszczanskij (left) and vossstrasse.com (right)

Tigerphobia

The Tiger I is undoubtedly an impressive-looking tank, with strong, purposeful lines and a squat, brutal appearance. The German propaganda machine worked hard to promote its image. Tiger crews were hand-picked from the best students of the tank schools  ,  and when the British captured their own example in April 1943, they realized how far behind they were in the tank arms race with Germany. Their heaviest tank, the A.22 Churchill, was slower, had lighter armor, and a significantly smaller gun than the German Tiger. It was put into production despite serious technical problems, and the design limited the ability to mount a gun equal to the Tiger’s. The only British tank of the time that was at least equal to the Tiger in terms of armor and firepower was the TOG-2 program. This could have already been in service by this time. However, since no “Tiger killer” was available, serious efforts were made to install the excellent 17-pounder gun in a tank, which eventually became the A.30 Challenger. The Americans also had a tank equivalent to the Tiger, the M6 Heavy Tank, a vehicle superior to the Tiger in some respects, which, like the TOG, had been available before April 1943. Like the British, this vehicle was shelved in favor of production of another vehicle, the M4 Sherman.
The result of British developments leading up to the completion of the new Cruiser (which became the Centurion) was the Sherman Firefly, and for the Americans, it is probably the M26 Pershing that best embodies the US effort to develop capable heavy tanks. The delay in producing and delivering a tank that was, at least on paper, the equal of the Tiger was, for many during the war, a serious Allied oversight and reinforced the impression that Allied aircrews were consistently outgunned. The subsequent arrival of even larger, heavier, and better-armored German Tigers did nothing to help, and only fueled this fear. Tiger phobia persisted throughout the war, and there are numerous accounts of tankers encountering “Tigers” only to find they had been attacked by tanks such as the Panzer IV, the Panther, or even anti-tank guns. Fear of the Tiger was not diminished by improvements in 6-pounder ammunition or the arrival of Shermans armed with 76mm guns, which posed a serious threat to the Tiger until 1944. The myth had spread in North Africa and was in full swing by the time of Villers Bocage, with open demands in the British Parliament for a counter-model to the vehicle. The Tiger’s legacy is perpetuated by these myths, best illustrated by the classic “It takes five Shermans to kill a Tiger” and Hollywood films from “Kelly’s Heroes” to “Fury.” The Tiger shock of 1942 and 1943 had subsided, but the pervasive fear among tank crews of a Tiger encounter had given it a reputation that no amount of scientific evidence of mechanical failures or combat problems over the years could dispel.

Foreign Service

Very few Tigers saw service with foreign armies, allied with Germany or not. The Japanese inspected one through their military attaché on July 30, 1943, and even paid the German government a certain sum for it. There were agreements to ship it after November 1944, but it was never delivered. As a result, Japanese interest was little more than a token gesture, as the tank was simply pushed back into normal service by the Germans.
A single Tiger I was delivered to Italy in 1943, before the September armistice, as the Italians had been struggling with their own heavy tank project for some time. It was operated for a short time by an Italian crew, but was returned to German control after September 1943. During its time in Italian service, it did not see any combat action.
Ten Tiger Is of the s.Pz.Abt. 503 were transferred by the Germans to the Hungarian Army to reinforce its armored forces when the unit was re-equipped with the PzKpfw VI Ausf.B King Tiger. Three more were presented as gifts to Major General Lászlo Hollósy-Kuthy (Commanding General Officer of the III Corps on the Eastern Front). These were formed into two companies and saw action against the Soviets by July 1944.
At least one Tiger remained in service after the war, being used as a test vehicle for projects in Czechoslovakia, although little information survives beyond a single turret blueprint.
The Soviets had captured examples of the Tiger by January 1943 at the latest, and the capture of intact vehicles meant that they could be used increasingly frequently against their former masters from December 1943 onwards. In Soviet service, these were painted with large Red Army identification stars to avoid friendly fire, but without a supply of spare parts, their service was short-lived, although enough captured tanks were available to form a small company of captured tanks (5 Tigers and 2 Panthers) by mid-1944. At one point, re-arming captured Tigers with the Soviet 100mm D-10T cannon was considered to bolster the Soviet tank force. The plan to build a tank with the somewhat boring name “T-VI-100”
, was abandoned in 1945 without any examples being produced. Between January and March 1945, a unit called “L’escadron autonome Besnier” was formed in France, equipped with repaired German tanks. This unit was equipped with a single Tiger of the latest model, along with other German vehicles. This Tiger served with the 2nd Squadron of the 6th Cuirassier Regiment and was used by the French occupation forces after the surrender of Germany and decommissioned in 1946. The vehicle is now in the Saumur Tank Museum in France.
The image of the Tiger is so enduring that as early as 1950, a source in the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported seeing “Tiger” tanks driving through the streets of Damascus, Syria – supposedly as part of an order for 50 vehicles from France. This was clearly a mistake for Panzer IVs, which actually came from Czechoslovakia. However, for a layperson observing vehicles in a parade, this may not be an unforgivable mistake. Such vehicles were never delivered to Syria.

Variants

Some Tiger Is were equipped as command vehicles (  Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger  ). This vehicle existed in two subvariants, equipped with the Fu 5 and Fu 8 (Sd.Kfz. 267) or Fu 5 and Fu 7 (Sd.Kfz. 268) radio sets in the turret. To accommodate this equipment and a GG400 generator, minor modifications were made, including the removal of the coaxial MG.34, the welding of a plug into the gun mantlet, the removal of 26 rounds of 8.8 cm ammunition, and the removal of the loader’s periscope.

Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger, command tank of s.Pz.Abt.503, pictured on 16 August 1943 (note the Roman numeral ‘I’ on the turret side), identifiable by the ‘umbrella’-style radio antenna on the roof. Source: Scheibert 1997.
The Sturmtiger (  38 cm RW61 on Sturmmorser Tiger  ) was the only major variant produced from the Tiger I chassis. Development began in 1943, and a prototype was completed in October of that year. Intended to destroy fortified enemy positions with a 380 mm  Rakentenwerfer   61 L/54 rocket, this beast possessed 150 mm thick frontal armor but was of little use in combat due to its limited mobility.
Another variant of the Tiger was a vehicle produced in Italy in the spring of 1944 and converted by a unit. The unit diary of s.Pz.Abt.508 records that several Tigers were damaged by landmines after fighting at the Isola Bella bridgehead in late February. Although all the vehicles were salvaged, three were beyond repair, and one was therefore  converted into a charge layer  . When captured by Allied forces, it was described as some sort of recovery vehicle due to the presence of a small winch and boom. Either way, this vehicle was a one-off and does not appear to have served any useful role.

Tiger load layer
found in Italy, summer 1944. Source: Fletcher. Some Tiger tanks used in the driving schools operated without turrets but, more importantly, were fitted with the wood gas system for propulsion, as this saved valuable fuel for the war effort. The Tiger I tank firing school at Putlos, Germany, also used at least two dismantled turrets. The markings seem to indicate that these turrets were removed from vehicles lost or damaged in action and then reused mounted on simple concrete crates.  Tiger I turrets in use at the Tiger I tank firing school at Putlos. Source: Willey, Hayton, and Vase.

Diploma

The VK45.01(H) was created somewhat by accident, combining parts of other projects into one. While its armor was substantial at design time, it lost strength over the course of the war. The VK45.02(H), which was intended to succeed the Tiger, opted for double-sloped upper frontal armor and dispensed with the vertical frontal step entirely. However, with the advent of the Tiger II, this “improved Tiger” never came to fruition. As with many heavy tanks, operational readiness was severely compromised by the cost of repair and maintenance, which primarily affected the Tiger’s combat performance. Even under optimal conditions, it suffered mechanical problems, exacerbated by the wear and tear of long marches, so many vehicles simply broke down and had to be abandoned or destroyed by their own crews.
Nevertheless, when the Tiger faced Allied tanks, it usually emerged victorious, with its armor and cannon being the deciding factors in combat. In skilled hands, exploiting the combination of terrain, long-range weaponry, and heavy armor, as at Medjez el Bab, Massa Marittima, and Villers Bocage, the Tiger contributed to a myth that bore no relation to its actual utility as a vehicle. Undoubtedly, the Tiger’s myth will live on for many, and this is perhaps its greatest impact on historians, modelers, and enthusiasts alike.
The final word on the Tiger may well belong to the British, who in 1944 summarized a series of very extensive technical, scientific, and practical studies and evaluations of the tank as follows:
“The PzKpfw VI, with its heavy armor, dual-purpose armament, and combat power, is fundamentally an excellent tank and, despite the noted deficiencies, represents a considerable advance over any tank we have tested to date. Its greatest weakness is probably its limited mobility due to its weight, width, and limited radius of action. Overall, it represents a formidable fighting machine that should not be underestimated.”

Surviving Tiger I Ausf.E tanks

The Bovington Tank Museum, UK (in operation)
Kubinka Tank Museum, Moscow, Russia (Tiger Panzerbefehlshaber converted to the standard Tiger)
Military History Museum, Lenin-Sengiri, Russia
Musee des Blindes, Saumur, France
Vimoutiers, Normandy, France
National Tank and Cavalry Museum, USA (restoration in progress)
Australian Tank and Artillery Museum – Tiger I turret (restoration in progress)